Turkey's EU Accession: Train Wreck or Red Light?

On November 15, 2006, Jonathan Davidson, Soner Cagaptay, and Mark Parris addressed The Washington Institute's Special Policy Forum. The following is a rapporteur's summary of Mr. Cagaptay's remarks.

Turkish accession to the EU is not a train wreck, but the slowest-moving train in the world, grinding along at an imperceptible rate. The make-or-break issue, at least in the immediate future, is Cyprus. Will this issue cause a rupture in accession talks? Probably not, since the Greek Cypriots who control this issue in the EU have the most to lose if accession talks collapse. If Turkey left the bargaining table, the island would be divided forever and Greek Cypriots would lose any hope of uniting the whole island under their rule. Thus, the Greek Cypriots have a vested interest in keeping talks alive even though they will push Turkey to the brink while doing this in order to get a maximum number of concessions.

Additionally, most large European countries believe that if Turkey left the table, it would not be as easy to bring Ankara back as it might have been in the 1990s. Turkey has changed much in the last decade and desires to be treated with respect by the Europeans. If it perceives that it is not so treated, it will look elsewhere, such as to Russia or China.

Even though talks will continue at a slow pace, future ruptures remain possible. Two key EU documents, the Enlargement Strategy Paper and the commission's progress report on Turkey, show that the EU is still acting as a gatekeeper in talks with Ankara. The style of the accession talks shows that these are not the generic talks had with other potential members, but Turkey-specific talks. For instance, in a novel way, the Enlargement Strategy Paper suggests "feeding political criteria into the entire negotiation process." Hence, when Turkey sits at the table to negotiate fisheries with the EU, Brussels might well be making demands on Ankara's policy toward the Kurds. The EU expects Turkey to perform better than other candidate countries—or even EU member states. For example, the progress report criticizes Turkey for its limited broadcasting policy for Kurds, while some EU member states, such as France and Greece, have broadcasting policies more limited than Turkey's.

Also, the report lacks context. One example is the EU notion that the Kurds are a minority in Turkey. In Turkey, the definition of a minority is based on religion, not language. Hence, most people (including most Kurds) do not consider the Kurds, who are Muslims, a minority. This is not a legal definition that can be changed with EU pressure, but a socially ingrained perception rooted in 600 years of Ottoman history, as well as in institutions such as the millet system.

So long as the terrorist Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK) continues to enjoy safe haven inside the EU, any EU demands on the Kurdistan issue will look insincere to the Turks. Unless the EU shuts down the PKK infrastructure inside the union entirely, Brussels's demands on the Kurdish issue will be as useless as the words of a wife-beater invited to speak at a conference on domestic abuse.

The bleak nature of Turkish-EU relations adds to the "perfect storm" Turkey is experiencing, which includes (1) fraying relations with the United States, and (2) public opinion that is increasingly identifying with Muslim causes in the Middle East. At a time when one of the two anchors that has tied Turkey to the West is damaged, should the EU anchor also be broken, that rupture would not bode well for Turkey's Western orientation.

A rupture would also be bad for the EU. Europe, especially France, has large populations of unassimilated, angry Muslims who are following Turkish accession very closely. To these people, Turkish accession is a test of whether or not they are European. If there is a rupture with Turkey, this will mean the further alienation of European Muslims. Social cohesion in the EU will decline and, ironically, France—the country most opposed to Turkey's accession—will suffer most from the domestic repercussions of an EU rupture with Turkey.

This rapporteur's summary was prepared by Institute research assistant Zeynep Eroglu.

receive the latest by email: subscribe to soner cagaptay's free mailing list

Spoken Items

Turkey's EU Accession: Train Wreck or Red Light?